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I. INTRODUCTION
TRADEMARK PROTECTION IN THE GLOBAL VILLAGE: THE NEED FOR
GLOBAL HARMONIZATION AND CENTRALIZATION
The world has become a "global village" in which the "medium is
the message."' A business engaged in international trade uses its
trademark' as the medium to convey its message. As the medium of the
1. See MARSHALL MCLUHAN, THE MEDIUM IS THE MESSAGE, AN INVENTORY OF
EFFECTS (1967); see also Kojo Yelpaala, Strategy and Planning in Global Product Distribution--
Beyond the Distribution Contract, 25 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 839 (1994) (describing the
globalization of business as a growing linkage among the world's economies created by three
interrelated business phenomena: 1) world as global village, 2) multinational/global enterprise,
and 3) global products); Ministerial Decisions and Declarations, Declaration on the Contribution
of the WTO to Achieving Greater Coherence in Global Economic Policymaking, Apr. 15, 1994,
33 I.L.M. 1249.
2. A "trademark" falls within the legal concept of "intellectual property." This Article
discusses only trademark rights and not other intellectual property forms such as copyright and
related rights, patents, trade secret, industrial designs, and layout designs of integrated circuits.
The term "trademark" includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof--(1) used by a person, or (2) which a person has a bona fide
intention to use in commerce and applies to register on the principal register
established by this chapter, to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a
unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source
of the goods, even if that source is unknown.
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994). Further, section 1127 of the United States Code describes a "mark" as
"any trademark, service mark, collective mark, or certification mark." Id. A "service mark"
"identiflies] and distinguish[es] the services of one person, including a unique service, from the
services of others and to indicate the source of the services, even if that source is unknown." Id. A
"collective mark" indicates a trademark or service mark used by the members of a cooperative, an
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message, the trademark becomes a valuable business asset which must be
protected from unfair competition and deceptive trade practices, including
counterfeit products and dilution.' However, international trademark
protection does not come easy because the global village lacks the
framework to provide such protection. Even if counsel possesses
knowledge and experience in both international trade and trademark law,'
international trademark protection may be evasive.
This Article demonstrates the need to rethink and reshape
international trademark protection for the global village rather than
maintaining a status quo controlled by territoriality. The doctrine of
territoriality recognizes that a trademark has a separate existence in each
sovereign territory where registered or legally recognized as a mark.5 This
means modern "trademark rights exist in each country solely according to
that country's statutory scheme. "6 Thus, international trademark protection
must be sought in each country where a business intends to use its
association, or other collective group or organization. Id. A "certification mark" demonstrates the
use by persons other than its owner "to certify regional or other origin, material, mode of
manufacture, quality, accuracy, or other characteristics of such person's goods or services or that the
work or labor on the goods or services was performed by members of a union or other
organization." Id. In this article, trademark includes service mark, collective mark, and
certification mark.
3. In the United States, the modem trademark establishes not only the origin and quality of
the goods or products but also a marketing device. Reddy Communications v. Environment
Action Found., 477 F. Supp. 936, 944 (D.D.C. 1979). "Businesses rely on trademarks to
establish reputation, distinguish competitor's products, advertise, and market goods . . . as
businesses expand beyond national borders, trademarks help to efficiently open markets and gain
consumer recognition of products or services." Minde G. Browning, International Trademark
Law: A Pathfinder and Selected Bibliography, 4 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 339, 339-40
(1994). In addition, "trademark law prohibits product imitators from passing off their goods as
those of another." Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad:
Toward a New Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L. REV. 273 (1991). Moreover, "[ilnadequate
protection of intellectual property undermines the goal of free trade because it leads to trade
distortions." Id. at 277 (citation omitted); see, e.g., Frank J. Garcia, Protection of Intellectual
Property Rights in the North American Free Trade Agreement: A Successfil Case of Regional
Trade Regulation, 8 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 817, 820 (1993) (finding piracy distorts trade
much the same as official trade barriers).
4. Yelpaala, supra note 1, at 840 (explaining that the global market demands international
counsel possess greater knowledge of related subject matter to handle more complex and
innovative transactions).
5. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
29.01(1) (3d ed. 1992).
6. Person's Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 1568-69 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Ingenohl
v. Olsen & Co., 273 U.S. 541, 544 (1927).
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trademark.7  However, statutory schemes differ in procedure and
substance, which makes obtaining such protection complicated and beyond
the financial resources of many businesses engaged in international trade.8
Further, even when a country offers trademark rights, it may enforce those
rights inadequately or ignore enforcement entirely,9 which, unfortunately,
vitiates a country's offer.'"
During the past year, international negotiators took a giant leap
towards international trademark protection for the global village when they
completed The Uruguay Round of the General Agreement of Tariffs and
Trade (GATT 94)" and The Trademark Law Treaty (TLT).'" Although
7. Rodolpho Sandoval & Chung-Pok Leung, A Comparative Analysis of Intellectual
Property Law in the United States and Mexico, and the Free Trade Agreement, 17 MD. J. INT'L
L. & TRADE 145, 146 (1993).
8. Gabriel M. Frayne, History and Analysis of TRT: Background, 63 TRADEMARK REP.
422 (1973).
To register, the international businessman is forced to meet different procedural and
substantive requirements in every country, to complete a bewildering variety of different
forms in different languages, to cope with different and sometimes unintelligible systems
of classifications of goods, to submit electro-types and prints differing in size and number,
and to pay disparate official fees in a plethora of currencies. After registration has been
obtained, its assignment, licensing or renewal is again subject to differences in national
treatment. Perhaps most painful of all, the international businessman's inability to cope
directly with all these differences compels him to retain, in each country in which he
desires protection, trademark attorneys or agents to do the necessary, against payment, of
course, of a reasonable professional fee for the unravelling of the mysteries of national
law.
Id. See also Tara K. Giunta & Lily H. Shang, Ownership of Information in a Global Economy, 27
GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcON. 327, 342 (1993-1994).
9. See, e.g., Leaffer, supra note 3, at 274-75 (describing the schism between developed
and developing countries in attitudes toward trademark enforcement); Giunta & Shang, supra
note 8, at 328. In addition, the United States uses the common law system which relies on case
precedent, but many countries (i.e., most of Central America, South America, and Western
Europe) rely on the civil law system which grounds itself in the codified law and, generally,
ignores case precedent. See Sandoval & Leung, supra note 7, at 152-53. Moreover, civil law
does not provide injunctive relief or other pre-trial remedies, unlike our common law system.
Id.
10. Jeffrey M. Samuels & Linda Samuels, The Changing Landscape of International
Trademark Law, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 433, 434 (1993).
11. The Final Act of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The Uruguay Round) and
Introductory Note, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 94]. Other documents annexed
thereto are reproduced also in volume 33, I.L.M.: Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, id. at 1143; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, and The Uruguay
Round Protocol GATT 1994, included under Agreements on Trade in Goods, id. at 1154;
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, Including Counterfeit Goods, id. at
1197; Agreement on Trade in Services, id. at 1168; Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement on Disputes, id. at 1226; and various Ministerial Decisions and
Declarations, id. at 1248. See infra pp. 92-96.
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these two agreements leave some problems unresolved, they demonstrate
the global village's desire to provide a basic multilateral framework for
international trademark protection. In addition, the United States Trade
Representative (USTR) has been negotiating bilateral and regional trade
agreements which reinforce and even strengthen the international
trademark protection provided in GATT 94. "
This Article advocates the expansion of these endeavors to create
adequate protection for the international trademark. The author argues
that this expansion cannot occur until international negotiators view the
world as the global village it has become. Protectionists must be deserted,
and the doctrine of territoriality must be reshaped, or even abandoned, in
favor of expansion which strengthens the global village.
The author further argues that global harmonization of national
laws to acquire trademark rights and centralization of trademark filings
and registrations must occur, because such harmonization and
centralization create the foundation for international trademark protection
in a global village. Given the lack of substantial opposition to
centralization and the current availability of computer technology, a
centralized system for international trademark filing and registration could
exist today, but negotiators have failed to put in place such a system. This
failure will continue until the negotiators embrace the global village and
initiate global harmonization.
Furthermore, the needs of both the developed and developing
countries must be considered. When initiating global harmonization, the
developed countries take the position that the trademark owner possesses a
property right in the trademark, and the developing countries take the
position that all their citizens need access to information for their
economies to grow.'4  The developing countries confront "two often
conflicting challenges. First, they must enter and participate in the global
marketplace on a substantive basis. Second, they must structure
meaningful legal regimes which legitimize their participation."" While the
trademark laws in many developed countries are well-established, such
laws are still evolving in most developing countries. 6
In addition, trademark laws among the developed countries may
differ, and even directly conflict. For example, to file a trademark, the
12. Trademark Law Treaty and Regulations Under the Trademark Law Treaty, Oct. 27,
1994, TLT/DC/53 WIPO [hereinafter TLT]; see infra pp. 92-96.
13. See 19 U.S.C. § 2171 (1994); Sandoval & Leung, supra note 7, at 147-48.
14. See Giunta & Shang, supra note 8, at 328-33.
15. Id.
16. Sandoval & Leung, supra note 7, at 147.
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United States requires use of, or a bona fide intent to use, a trademark in
commerce,'7 but other countries do not require use or even an intent to
use. However, this Article's purpose is not to enumerate those conflicts
but rather to advocate international trademark protection through global
harmonization of national trademark laws and centralization of trademark
filing and registration. Thus, this Article focuses only on global
harmonization and centralization, and it does not discuss the enforcement
of trademark laws or other problems of domestic and international
trademark protection.
Part One surveys international agreements containing trademark
rights and obligations. It further analyzes the failure of these agreements
to protect trademarks in the global village. At best, they provide a
minimum standard for international trademark protection. Generally, they
do not address global harmonization of national trademark laws. This
failure prevents the establishment of a viable centralized trademark filing
and registration system, even if these international agreements address
centralization.
Part Two proposes that multilateral, regional, and bilateral
agreements provide the medium for global harmonization and
centralization. Section One of Part Two recommends that the Council for
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property" be the primary initiator of
global harmonization and centralization. Section Two of Part Two further
recommends that regional and bilateral agreements strengthen and
reinforce a Council for TRIPS' initiative for global harmonization and
centralization. Finally, this Article concludes, optimistically, that a
Council for TRIPS' initiative supported with regional and bilateral
agreements can provide adequate trademark protection in the global
village.
II. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT
TRADEMARKS IN THE GLOBAL VILLAGE
This section delineates, in historical order, the principal
international agreements'9 which contain trademark rights and obligations.
In addition, it demonstrates the lack of international trademark protection
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(b) (1994).
18. GATT 94 establishes the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods. See infra pp. 92, 97-100.
19. These agreements, which include treaties and conventions, may be multilateral,
regional, bilateral, or bipartite.
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because none of these agreements provide both harmonization of national
trademarks laws and centralization of trademark filing and registration.
A. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of
1883, as revised and amended (Paris Convention)
In 1883, the Paris Convention established intellectual property
rights and obligations in an international agreement, resulting in the first
multilateral agreement addressing trademarks.2" Prior to this time, a few
bilateral treaties, some involving the United States, and at least sixty-nine
bipartite treaties offered some form of trademark protection to foreigners.2
Although the Paris Convention addresses trademarks and other marks,
patents, utility models, and industrial designs, this Article examines only
the rights and obligations relating to trademarks.
The Paris Convention provides trademark protection based on
national treatment, priority rights, and registration.22 National treatment
prohibits a country from providing less favorable trademark treatment to
foreigners than to its citizens, but no requirement of reciprocal treatment
exists.23 The Paris Convention further prohibits any signatory from
20. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883, Mar. 20, 1883, 25
Stat. 1372, T.S. No. 379, as revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, 53 Stat. 1748, 21 U.S.T.
1630 (entered into force on Apr. 26, 1970) [hereinafter Paris Convention]. In 1979, an
amendment was adopted, but it addressed only administrative matters and not any procedural or
substantive matters of trademark protection.
On March 20, 1883, eleven countries signed the original convention, the Convention of the
Union of Paris, and the United States became a signatory in 1887. Today, the Paris Convention
has 103 members, but not all signatories have signed the same version. Generally, the most
recent version signed by all nations in question constitutes the applicable version unless, when
ratifying or acceding, a nation excluded certain articles of that version. John B. Pegram,
Trademark Law Revision: Section 44, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 141, 151 (1988).
The later versions tried to preserve the original numbering of the articles. Beginning with
the Washington Conference, any new provisions which did not fit into the old article was inserted
as a new article having French ordinal suffixes bis, ter, quinter, quinquies, sexies, and septies.
See id. at 154.
21. Pegram, supra note 20, at 153-54 (explaining historical background of trademark
protection prior to Paris Convention).
22. Paris Convention, supra note 20.
23. Paris Convention, supra note 20, art. 2. The Paris Convention defines national
treatment.
[T]he Nationals of any country of the Union shall, as regards the protection of
[trademarks], enjoy in all the other countries of the Union the advantages that their
respective laws now grant, or may hereafter grant, to nationals; all without prejudice
to the rights specially provided for by this Convention. Consequently, they shall have
the same protection as the latter, and the same legal remedy against any infringement
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requiring domicile or establishment in its country to obtain trademark
protection.24 National treatment for trademark protection existed prior to
the Paris Convention25 and has continued as the basis for most international
agreements offering trademark protection. The Paris Convention has been
criticized because of its use of national treatment which allows a country to
avoid providing trademark proiection for foreigners if it does not provide
trademark protection for its citizens. 6
However, the Paris Convention initiated the right of priority,
which creates a nationally-based priority filing date. 7 The filing date of a
duly filed trademark application in one of the Union countries can be
claimed as a right of priority at any time within six months in
corresponding applications in other Union countries.' The domestic laws
of each country determine the conditions for the filing and registration of a
trademark.29 The Paris Convention does not provide for centralized filing
or registration. Thus, a trademark owner must file and register in each
country where protection is desired"' unless another agreement exists
which provides for centralization of filing and registration.'
of their rights, provided that the conditions and formalities imposed upon nationals are
complied with.
Id.
The Union consists of the Paris Convention signatories and exists for the protection of
industrial property, including trademark protection. Id. art. 1.
24. Id. art. 2.
25. See Pegram, supra note 20, at 154.
26. See Monique L. Cordray, GA7T v. WIPO, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
121, 123 (1994).
27. See Pegram, supra note 20, at 155 (explaining no prior bilateral treaty contained right
of priority).
28. See id.; Paris Convention, supra note 20, art. 4.
29. Paris Convention, supra note 20, art. 6. Article 6 provides: (1) a trademark
registration application by a national of a Union country in any Union country "may not be
refused, nor may a registration be invalidated, on the ground that filing, registration, or renewal
has not been affected in the country of origin," and (2) "[a] mark duly registered in a country of
the Union shall be regarded as independent of marks registered in the other countries of the
Union, including the country of origin." Id.
30. See Browning, supra note 3, at 342 (explaining that the Paris Convention "does not
provide trademark protection across Paris Union members' borders").
31. Paris Convention, supra note 20, art. 19. "[The countries of the Union reserve the
right to make separately between themselves special agreements for the protection of industrial
property, in so far as these agreements do not contravene the provisions of this Convention." Id.
This allows additional agreements without violating the international agreement principle of
specialty.
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Although the Paris Convention sets some minimum standards for
national trademark laws in Union countries,32 no serious discussion
regarding harmonization of national trademark laws has occurred among
Union countries. Since the global village did not exist in 1883 and was
only in its infancy during the Stockholm Convention in 1967, the lack of
such discussion during those times can be understood. However, the
global village does exist today," but the International Bureau, and the
World Intellectual Property Organization" have been unwilling to seriously
discuss global harmonization of national trademark laws. This has resulted
in failed attempts to create a global centralized trademark filing and
registration system.3 Such failure supports the author's argument that
global centralization of trademark filing and registration will not be viable
without global harmonization of national trademark laws.
B. Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of
Marks of 1891, as revised and amended (Madrid Agreement)
In 1891, some of the Paris Union countries established the Madrid
Agreement to create a uniform system for the international filing and
registration of trademarks.' The Madrid Agreement allows its member
countries38 to "secure protection [in all Madrid Union countries] for their
32. Paris Convention, supra note 20, arts. 6-11 (enumerating specific rights and
obligations of trademarks and other marks). This Article's purpose is not to enumerate such
rights and obligations in any international agreement, but rather to determine if global
harmonization of national trademark laws, and centralization of trademark filing and registration
occurred, and if not, whether such harmonization and centralization should occur.
33. See Yelpaala, supra note 1.
34. The Paris Convention established the International Bureau to administer the
Convention. Paris Convention, supra note 20, art. 15.
35. The International Bureau was incorporated into the World Intellectual Property
Organization when it took over the administration of the Paris Convention and the Madrid
Unions. See infra pp. 79-80.
36. See infra pp. 76-78, 81-84.
37. Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, Apr. 14, 1891,
828 U.N.T.S. 389 [hereinafter Madrid Agreement]. The Madrid Agreement has been revised the
following six times since it was signed on April 14, 1891: at Brussels in 1900, Washington in
1911, The Hague in 1925, London in 1934, Nice in 1957 (most substantive changes), Stockholm
in 1967, and amended on October 2, 1979. The Assembly of the Madrid Union and the
Committee of Directors of National Industrial Property Offices of the Madrid Union met at
Geneva in joint extraordinary sessions from April 18 to 22, 1988, and unanimously adopted the
Regulations to the Madrid Agreement. See Regulations of Apr. 22, 1988, The Madrid
Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, 1 BASIC DOCS. INT'L ECON. L.
(CCH) 781 (1994).
38. "The countries to which this Agreement applies constitute a Special Union for the
international registration of marks." Madrid Agreement, supra note 37, art. 1(1) [hereinafter
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[trademarks], registered in the country of origin, by filing the said
[trademarks] at the International Bureau39 . . . .through the intermediary
of the Office of the said country of origin."' This extends the Paris
Convention's territoriality principal by allowing individual national
registrations in the Madrid Union if the trademark applicant procedurally
followed the Madrid Agreement and its Regulations, and the individual
countries, where registrations are sought, approve the application based on
their individual national laws.4' Without such approval, the registrations
by themselves confer no substantive rights because such rights flow only
from the national laws where the applicant sought registration. 2 Thus,
filing a trademark registration application with the International Bureau
offers a single location to apply for trademark registration in multiple
Madrid Union countries, but extends no substantive rights unless and until
the individual national trademark offices recognize the trademark
registration as valid under their national laws. 3
Although general support existed in the United States for a
centralized trademark filing and registration system, the United States did not
join the Madrid Agreement. The United States' rejection was based on
numerous objections. First, the Madrid Agreement requires the filing of a
trademark application based on perfection of a home country or basic
Madrid Union]. Almost forty countries, including the Russian Federation, China, and most of
Europe currently belong to the Madrid Union, but the United States is not a member. See
Samuels & Samuels, supra note 10, at 441-42. However, if a United States corporation owns a
subsidiary domiciled in any Madrid Union country, then it may obtain registration under the
Madrid Agreement in the name of that subsidiary. See Madrid Agreement, supra note 36, art.
1(2)(3).
39. See Paris Convention, supra note 20 The International Bureau was incorporated into
the WIPO when it took over the administration of the Paris Convention and the Madrid Unions.
See infra pp. 79-80.
40. Madrid Agreement, supra note 37, art. 1(2).
41. See Browning, supra note 3, at 342-43 (describing the method of filing and
registration); Samuels & Samuels, supra note 10, at 442-43 (enumerating the Madrid
Agreement's specific articles pertaining to filing and registration); Joseph Greenwald & Charles
Levy, Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, Introduction, 1
B.D.I.E.L. 759 (1994) (explaining not only filing and registration procedure, but also Madrid
Agreement facilitates trademark filing in different countries by allowing applicant to file one
application, in one language, and to pay one set of fees to seek protection in multiple
jurisdictions); Roger E. Schecter, Facilitating Trademark Registration Abroad: The Implications
of U.S. Ratification of the Madrid Protocol, 25 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 419 (1991)
(finding Madrid Agreement provides efficient, economical means to obtain simultaneous
trademark protection in numerous foreign countries and explaining procedure).
42. Samuels & Samuels, supra note 10, at 442.
43. See Browning, supra note 3, at 343 (citing INT'L TRADEMARK ASs'N, MADRID
PROTOCOL: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE (1993)).
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registration requirement." This disadvantages the United States trademark
applicant because registration takes longer in the United States than in most
countries. ' Next, the Madrid Agreement requires a twelve month time limit
for refusing to register a trademark registration. ' This time limit is too short
because examination of a trademark in the United States involves a lengthy
process."" For the United States to complete its examination within twelve
months would require giving Madrid Union Application priority over
domestic applications which would cause a longer pendency for domestic
applications.'" The Madrid Agreement also requires the inclusion of a
central attack provision which requires the trademark protection resulting
from the Madrid registration to cease completely if within five years from
the date of such registration, the home country registration is successfully
attacked, in whole or in part.49 This is considered to be unfair to the United
States trademark owners because the United States has many more grounds
for attacking registration than most other countries.' Next, the Madrid
Agreement lacks a use or bona fide intent to use requirement for filing or
registration.5  This disadvantages the United States which requires use or
intent to use for registering a trademark.' The Madrid Agreement also lacks
a standard description for classifying goods and services in trademark
registrations.53 The Madrid Agreement increases the likelihood of increased
dead wood (abandoned trademarks) on the national registry.'
Thus, since the Madrid Agreement conflicted with aspects of United
States trademark law and did not harmonize national trademark laws, its
centralized filing and registration system could not be accepted by the Untied
States. However, regardless of the shortcomings of the Madrid Agreement,
support was not lost for a centralized trademark filing and registration
system."
44. See Samuels & Samuels, supra note 10, at 443-44.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Samuels & Samuels, supra note 10, at 443-44.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Samuels & Samuels, supra note 10, at 443-44.
55. See Anthony R. DeSimone, In Support of TRT, 63 TRADEMARK REP. 492 (1973);
infra pp. 77-78, 81-86.
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C. Pan American Convention of 1929, as revised, including the
General Inter-American Convention for the Protection of
Trademarks (Pan American Convention)
The Pan American Convention of 1929, as revised, consists of two
separate parts: a Convention for Trade Mark and Commercial Protection,
and a Protocol on Inter-American Registration of Trade Marks.' This
Convention was the first attempt in the Western Hemisphere to harmonize
national trademark laws and provide a centralized filing and registration
system. Although the Convention provides for national treatment and a
centralized filing and registration system, it does not strengthen the Paris
Convention nor the Madrid Agreement. However, it does show the desire
for cooperation among countries located in the same region even before
the world had become a global village.
Fourteen nations of the Western Hemisphere, including the United
States, but not Canada, are parties to at least one of the conventions. The
United States is a member of the Pan American Convention, but it
renounced the Protocol in the mid-1940s. The Bureau administering the
Convention, the Inter-American Trade Mark Bureau, was located in
Havana, Cuba, but it has closed."' Compared to the Paris Convention,58
this Convention never acquired any significance. Now, with GATT 94
and other recent regional developments, this Convention becomes
irrelevant.59
D. Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of
Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of
Marks of 1957, as revised (Nice Agreement)
The Nice Agreement" constitutes an international trademark
classification agreement compatible with the global village. When
registering a trademark, most countries require the applicant to describe
the goods and services to be protected. However, such description may be
problematic because trademark classification systems in various countries
56. General Inter-American Convention for Trade-Mark and Commercial Protection, Feb.
20, 1929, 46 Stat. 2907, 124 L.N.T.S. 357.
57. See Browning, supra note 3, at 356.
58. Id.
59. See infra pp. 100-102.
60. Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification for Goods and Services for
the Purposes of the Registration of Marks, June 15, 1957, 23 U.S.T. 1336, 550 U.N.T.S. 45,
revised, at Geneva on May 13, 1977, (entered into force on Feb. 6, 1979) [hereinafter Nice
Agreement].
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differ in the particularity of their description requirements. Thus, the
International Bureau6' established the International Classification system, 62
creating specific descriptive classes for filing an international application.
If, at any time, the International Classification system needs to be changed
or revised, the Committee of Experts may make such changes or
63revisions.
The Nice Agreement exemplifies an agreement which embraces
the global village, but it merely addresses the issue of descriptive
classification of trademarks. The Nice Agreement is procedural in nature;
it does not address any substantive trademark issues. No rights or
obligations flow from any classification designation in the Nice
Agreement.' However, it does facilitate trademark searching which may
help to prevent trademark confusion and infringement.'
E. Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property
Organization of 1967, as revised (WIPO)
The WIPO has attempted to govern international intellectual
property matters since it entered into force in 1970. The expressed
objectives of the WPO are "to promote the protection of intellectual
property throughout the world through cooperation among States and,
where appropriate, in collaboration with any other international
organization," and "to ensure administrative cooperation among the
Unions. "67
61. See Paris Convention, supra note 20. The International Bureau was incorporated into
the world Intellectual Property Organization when it took over the administration of the Paris
Convention and the madrid Unions. See infra pp. 79-80.
62. Nice Agreement, supra note 60, art. 1(1). Although Article I requires the use of the
International Classification system, Article 2(2) allows each member country to "reserve[] the
right to use the classification either as a principal or as a subsidiary system." Id. art. 2(2). The
author contends that this reservation causes no substantial problems so long as the International
Classification system is used.
63. Id. art. 3(3).
64. Id. art. 2(1).
65. See Browning, supra note 3, at 354.
66. Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14, 1967,
21, U.S.T. 1749, 828 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force on Apr. 26, 1970) [hereinafter WIPO].
More than 400 delegates and observers attended this Conference including the United States who,
prior to the Convention, had reviewed the questions and proposals of private organizations and,
at the Convention, submitted numerous proposals of which many were adopted. Jeremiah D.
McAuliffe, Prospects for Improved Protection of Trademarks in International Trade, 61
TRADEMARK REP. 82, 83 (1971).
67. WIPO, supra note 67, art. 3.
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The WIPO succeeded the International Bureau for the Protection of
Intellectual Property which the Paris Convention created.' In 1974, the
WIPO became a specialized agency of the United Nations with its
headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland. It has a General Assembly, a
representative body consisting of delegates from each of its 116 member
states, which appoints its Director General. '
Currently, the WIPO administers seventeen multilateral and
regional agreements, such as the Paris Convention, the Madrid
Agreement, and the Nice Agreement.7 Within its committee structure,
two groups focus on international trademark law: the Permanent
Committee on Industrial Property Information ad hoc Working Group on
Trademark Information (PCIPI/TI) and the Committee of Experts on the
Harmonization of Laws for the Protection of Marks (CEHLPM). The
PCIPI/TI explores trademark information collection and storage including
trademark search systems, examination methods, application numbering
systems, and classifications. The CEHLPM examines harmonization of
the trademark laws and recently developed a trademark administration
treaty to facilitate worldwide trademark filing7 called the TLT.72
At its inception, some WIPO convention delegates thought "[the
WIPO's] existence [would] affect trademark rights at least in the same of
affording a better structured and administrated vehicle through which our
trademark interests [could] be identified and debated."" However, by
1987, the United States General Accounting Office, Division of National
Security and International Affairs (GAO) concluded that although the
WIPO constitutes the foremost multilateral intellectual property forum, the
government had made only limited progress towards strengthening
international intellectual property rights and obligations through the
WIPO. 7' The GAO further concluded that this limited progress was due to
the United States government actively opposing the efforts of developing
countries to weaken existing international standards for trademark
68. See Paris Convention, supra note 20 and accompanying text; see also Browning, supra
note 3, at 341.
69. See Cordray, supra note 26, at 122 n.1.
70. d. at 122 n.2.
71. See Browning, supra note 3, at 352.
72. TLT, supra note 12; see infra pp. 92-96.
73. See McAuliffe, supra note 66.
74. Id. at 124 n.8. Dissatisfied with the WIPO's lack of progress in protecting and
enforcing intellectual property rights, the United States, in 1986, shifted its efforts from the
WIPO to the GATT's Uruguay Round negotiations. Id. at 121.
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protection."3 While agreeing with the GAO's conclusion, the author
continues to argue that international trademark protection will remain
inadequate until both the developed and developing countries view the
world as a global village and begin serious efforts toward harmonizing
national trademark laws.
F. Vienna Trademark Registration Treaty, 1973 (TRT)
The TRT76 resulted from the WIPO's failure to negotiate a revision
to the Madrid Agreement acceptable to the countries, including the United
States, which refused to accede to the Madrid Agreement" but wanted to
participate in an international filing and registration system. 8 When the
negotiations deadlocked, the WIPO asked the United States for a solution,
and the United States responded by proposing the TRT.79
The TRT created a compromise between those countries
establishing ownership based on registration without priority of trademark
use and those requiring priority of trademark use. It eliminated the
Madrid Agreement's requirement of home registration and eliminated the
United States' priority of trademark use requirement in favor of a
declaration of intention to use. In addition, it allowed a minimum of three
years with a discretionary extension to five years or more before
trademark use becomes mandatory. It also permitted national law to bar
an infringement action until after actual trademark use occurred within its
borders.80
However, the international trademark community views the TRT
as a failure. Although over fifty countries participated in the Vienna
diplomatic conference, the TRT was ratified only by the five Paris Union
75. Id.
76. The full tect of the Vienna Trademark Registration Treaty format is reprinted in the
back of the TRADEMARK REP. (Nov.-Dec. 1993) [hereinafter TRT]. See Introductory
Memorandum to the July 20, 1972 Draft of the TRT, WIPO document TRT/DC/3, (July 30,
1972); Implementation of the Recommendations of the May 1972 TRT Committee of Experts,
WIPO document TRT/DC/4, Aug. 15, 1972.
The TRT went to the Vienna diplomatic conference on May 12, 1973. Although the United
States signed it on June 12, 1973, it never ratified the TRT due to the TRT's inherent conflict
with its trademark law (both the Lanham Act and common law). See Browning, supra note 3, at
346.
77. See infra pp. 82-83.
78. The use of registration in the TRT's title constitutes a misnomer because the TRT
provides for filing but not registration. See Walter J. Derenberg, The Myth of the Proposed
International Trademark "Registration" Treaty (TR), 68 TRADEMARK REP. 433, 438 (1978).
79. See Frayne, supra note 8, at 422-29.
80. See Derenberg, supra note 78, at 438-39.
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countries which brought the TRT into force: Burkina Faso, Congo,
Gabon, the Soviet Union, and Togo." In addition, the TRT no longer
appears in the publications listing current treaties in force. The author
argues that the basic compromise contained in the TRT could have been a
beginning for harmonization of national trademark laws, but the
international trademark community was not ready for the global village
which was only in its infancy at that time.
G. Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the
International Regulation of Marks of 1989 (Madrid Protocol)
After the TRT failed to attract sufficient signatories to make it
viable, the Madrid Union requested the WIPO to continue considering
changes to the Madrid Agreement which would allow Great Britain,
Ireland, Denmark, Greece, and the United States to join.' The WIPO
responded with the Madrid Protocol. 3  Initially, the international
trademark community, including the United States, hailed the Madrid
Protocol as acceptable to everyone."
Although the Madrid Protocol was similar to the Madrid
Agreement, the Madrid Protocol seemed to cure the ills of the Madrid
Agreemente for several reasons. First, the Madrid Protocol allowed an
international trademark application (WIPO application) based on a mere
filing of a national trademark application rather than a perfected national
registration.' In addition, it extended the time to refuse the WIPO
application from twelve months to eighteen months'. It also revised the
fee structure by allowing a member country to charge its national fees for
examining the WIPO application.u The Madrid Protocol further
81. See Browning, supra note 3, at 346.
82. See Browning, supra note 3, at 347-48. In addition, the Madrid Union wanted the
WIPO to consider how to link the Madrid Agreement and the proposed European Community
Trade Mark. See id. at 348.
83. Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration
of Marks, June 27, 1989, WIPO Pub. No. 204(E) [hereinafter Madrid Protocol].
84. See Madrid Protocol Implementation Act: Hearing Before the House Committee on the
Judiciary, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1993) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Richard Berman,
President of International Trademark Association); Samuels & Samuels, supra note 10, at 445-
46; compare Allan Zelnick, The Trademark Forum: The Madrid Protocol--Some Reflection, 82
TRADEMARK REP. 651 (1992) with Jeffrey M. Samuels, Letter to the Editor, 82 TRADEMARK
REP. 810 (1992).
85. See infra pp. 82-83.
86. Madrid Protocol, supra note 83, art. 2(1).
87. Id. art. 5(2)(b).
88. Id. art. 6(3)(4).
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diminished the negative effects of central attack because an attacked
registration could be converted into a separate national registration with an
effective filing date of the original WIPO application's filing date. 9
Finally, it designated French and English as the official languages.'
Anticipating ratification of the Madrid Protocol,9 Congress
introduced implementing legislation.' Initially, this legislation received
wide support from the Clinton Administration, Congress, and the domestic
trademark and intellectual property associations." Unexpectedly, the
Administration withdrew its support because of the Madrid Protocol
provisions relating to the intergovernmental organizations and their voting
rights.' However, the Administratin had "no problem with the substance
of the treaty beyond these issues. ""
The House of Representatives passed the implementing legislation
on October 3, 1994, but before passing this legislation, the House of
89. Id. art. 8(7)(a).
90. Draft Regulations Under the Madrid Agreement and the Madrid Protocol 16, Rule
6(2)(i), WIPO Doc. GT/PM/VI/2 (Mar. 8, 1994).
91. Madrid Protocol, supra note 83, art. 14 (requiring four instruments of ratification, one
of which must be from a Madrid Union member).
92. H.R. 2129, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); 5. 977, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); see
Bills Would Implement Madrid Protocol for International Trademark, 46 Pat. Trademark &
Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1131, at 53 (May 20, 1993) (discussing Madrid Protocol and the
implementing legislation).
93. See, e.g., House Panel Airs Bill to Implement U.S. Accession to Madrid Trademark
Pact, 46 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1132, at 94 (May 27, 1993).
94. See State Dep't Announcement That U.S. Will Not Join Madrid Protocol, 48 Pat.
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1180, at 94 (May 19, 1994).
Under the terms of the Protocol, members may be countries or, under certain
conditions, intergovernmental organizations with regional trademark offices. These
organizations would receive a vote in the assembly of the members in addition to votes
exercised by the member states of the organization. They would also be counted
towards the members needed for the Protocol to enter into force, in addition to their
member states. Finally, there is no provision for the intergovernmental organization to
make a declaration of its competence. The United States does not accept such an
expansion of the role of intergovernmental organizations and their members. In other
agreements, we consistently have insisted on safeguard provisions to prevent
concurrent voting and double counting, and on a declaration of competence.
The Administration recognized the problems when giving its endorsement, but, at
that time, viewed it as "an exception to the general obligations . . . problems were
outweighed by the benefits of the agreement. But the EU recently has been citing the
Madrid Protocol as precedent for similar voting rights in the negotiations on the TLT
and the Hague Agreement on Industrial Designs." U.S. Will Not Join Madrid
Protocol on International Trademarks, 48 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No.
1180, at 81-82 (May 19, 1994) (describing the Journal's conversation with Attorney
Advisor Carlisle Walters from PTO's Office of Legislation and International Affairs).
95. Id. at 82.
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Representatives took into consideration the Administration's position. The
House of Representatives amended the legislation (H.R. 2129) with the
following new language on the effective date: "Subject to satisfactory
resolution of the issues relating to voting rights of Member nations under
the Madrid Protocol, this Act shall take effect on the date on which the
Madrid Protocol enters into force with respect to the United States."9
The Madrid Protocol has not entered into force because only Spain
has ratified it to date. '  The history of the Madrid Agreement, the
Trademark Registration Treaty, and the Madrid Protocol evidences the
desire for an international centralized filing and registration system, but
prove that desire is not enough. Although the global village existed when
the WIPO began its negotiations which resulted in the Madrid Protocol,
the international trademark community refused to recognize the global
village.
H. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 94)
1. A Brief History
The words, "The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade," or
"GATT," belong to a multilateral trade agreement concluded in October
1947 between 23 developed and undeveloped countries (GATT 47).9" This
occurred immediately after World War II, a time when most agreed that
economic recovery depended on restoring and expanding former levels of
international trade.19  However, the war left two major barriers: high
96. See Panel Approves Madrid Protocol Bill Subject to EU Voting Rights Issue, 48 Pat.
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1185, at 188 (June 23, 1994).
97. To obtain the current status of the Madrid Protocol, contact the WIPO: 34 Chemin des
Colombettes, CH 1211 Geneva 20, Switzerland; telephone number: (22) 730 91 11; and fax
number: (22) 733 54 28. The Madrid Protocol will not enter into force until five countries ratify
it.
98. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S.
187 [hereinafter GATT 47].
99. Robert E. Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law: The Evolution of the Modem
GAIT Legal System 3, 4 (1993). This book provides an excellent history and explanation of the
initial negotiations for an International Trade Organization Charter (ITO) and the Preparatory
Committee's negotiation of a trade agreement, GATI 47, among themselves, which they
intended to be merely provisional and would fold into the ITO structure after its ratification. Id.
at 4-7. However, the ITO was never ratified; thus, GATT 47 and its seven additional rounds
evolved into the foremost international trade agreement without the support of the ITO or any
formal organization. Id. Yet, GATT has functioned as an organization de facto, having a
building in Geneva, a staff, committees, budgets, and internal rules, but until the conclusion of
The Uruguay Round, most member countries viewed GATT 47 and its seven additional rounds
solely as an agreement, refusing to acknowledge an organization. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld,
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tariffs and quantitative trade restrictions.'" The GATT 47 provided a
means to substantially reduce tariffs and limit the right to use other trade
restrictions.'' In addition, it established five basic principles which
continue to evolve: the most favored nation principle, the national
treatment principle, the tariff concession principle, principle against
nontariff barriers, and the fair trade principle. "
Since GATT 47, seven additional rounds of negotiation have
occurred: Annecy (1949), Tourquay (1950), Geneva (1956), Dillon
(1961), Kennedy (1962-67), Tokyo (1973-79), and Uruguay (1986-
1993).103 The first five rounds concentrated on reducing tariff barriers to
trade in goods.'" The sixth round, the Tokyo Round Codes, focused on
reforming dispute resolution and reducing non-tariff barriers to trade in
goods, including regulatory measures to deal with counterfeit goods.' °5
This was the first time a GATT round discussed trademark rights, although
it was only in the context of controlling infringement of trademark
rights. "
The Tokyo Round permitted member countries to approve separate
Codes, and they were bound only by the Codes they signed and
approved."° The Uruguay Round (GATT 94) departed from the first six
Remedies Along With Rights: Institutional Reform in the New GATT, 88 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 477, 478 (July 1994).
100. Id.
101. See HUDEC, supra note 99, at 4.
102. See Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad:
Toward a New Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L. REV. 273, 299 (1991) (enumerating and explaining
GATT's basic principles, citing GAIT's article numbers); John W. Head, Making International
Trade Less Foreign: A "Nutshell" for NonSpecialists on the Changing Rules Governing
International Trade, J. KAN. B. ASS'N 42, 43 (1992) (enumerating and explaining GATiT's basic
principles, citing GATT's article numbers). Since this Article focuses on trademark protection in
international trade, the author relies on Leaffer's explanations for the principles that do not relate
to trademark protection; and, for those principles that do relate, they are explained throughout
this Article.
103. See HUDEC, supra note 99, at 3-273; see also JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING
THE GATT SYSTEM 37 (1990).
104. See Todd S. Shenkin, Comment, Trade-Related Investment Measures in Bilateral
Investment Treaties and the GAlT: Moving Toward a Multilateral Investment Treaty, 55 U.
Prr. L. REV. 541, 558 (1994).
105. See Mitsuo Matsushita, A Japanese Perspective on Intellectual Property Rights and
the GATT, 1992 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 81 (1992) (explaining Tokyo Round's interest in
trademark rights led to TRIPS). Prior to the Tokyo Round, GATT mentioned trademarks only in
Article IX, prohibiting marks of origin from impeding international trade, and Article XX(d),
enumerating trademarks, patents, copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices as
exceptions in GAT. See Leaffer, supra note 102, at 299.
106. Id.
107. See Lowenfeld, supra note 99, at 478.
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rounds because it included an intellectual property annex 1°8 and established
the World Trade Organization (WTO)' ° among other initiatives." In
addition, it was an "all or nothing" agreement, meaning that a signatory
had to agree to the entire agreement with its annexes and be bound by it,
or not be a member country."' Could this mean the GATT 94 signatories
recognize our global village and will embrace it by promoting global
harmonization of national trademarks laws and centralization of filing and
registration?
2. Trademark Protection in GATT 94: The TRIPS
"I gavel the Uruguay Round has concluded . . . . Today, the
world has chosen openness and cooperation instead of uncertainty and
conflict. This is a success that will reinforce economic growth," declared
GATT's Director General Peter Sutherland to the representatives from the
117 member countries in Punta del Este, Uruguay, on December 15,
1993.1 Although the Uruguay Round took seven years to complete, and
"at times seemed more likely to reveal the irreconcilable trade rivalries of
the post-cold war world than its determination to pursue a quest for freer
trade, lower tariffs and greater economic cooperation," it resulted in
GATT 94 "provid[ing] the basis for global economic growth and cohesion
into the 21st century."" 3 Since GATT 94 now exists, and the United
States recently enacted implementing legislation,"' this section analyzes
108. The Agreement for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including
Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Annex IC to the Agreement for the Establishment of the World
Trade Organization, April 15, 1995, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
109. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, approved April 15, 1994, 11
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 636 (Apr. 20, 1994) [hereinafter WTO]. "The WTO shall
provide the common institutional framework for the conduct of trade relations among it Members
." Id. Art. II(1). GATT struggled for almost one-half of a century without a formal
organization, but the WTO now exists to administer GATT 94.
110. Other innovative initiatives in GATT 94 include the Trade-Related Aspects of
Investment Measures (TRIMS), Trade in Services, and the Dispute Settlement Understanding.
111. See Lowenfeld, supra note 99, at 478-79; The GATT Lady Sings: What the New
WTO Will Mean for the U.S. and World Trade, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 595 (Apr.
13, 1994) (quoting John H. Jackson, a scholar in GAIT, "[n]o longer will the Tokyo Round
approach of side codes--resulting in 'GATT a la carte'--be the norm," but rather WTO will
reinforce "single package" idea that country must accept all Uruguay Round agreements annexed
to WTO, with few exceptions, or nothing at all).
112. See Roger Cohen, The World Trade Agreement: The Overview; GATT Talks End in
Joy and Relief, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1993, at DI.
113. Id.
114. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994)
[hereinafter URAA]. The URAA was enacted under the "fast-track" mechanism for trade
agreements, which mandates Congress to approve or reject the entire implementing legislation
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only the TRIPS agreement. It does not discuss the negotiations after the
Tokyo Round leading to the Uruguay Round and the inclusion of
intellectual property into GATT 94.11"
"The TRIPS agreement establishes substantially higher standards
of protection for a full range of intellectual property rights that are
embodied in current international agreements, and provides for the
effective enforcement of those standards both internally and at the
border."" 6  The TRIPS consists of a preamble"7 and seven parts, divided
into a total of 73 articles."8 Although TRIPS covers seven forms of
intellectual property, this Article addresses only trademarks. First, it
proposed by the Clinton Administration without any revision. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2902(e),
2903(b) (1994). The URAA makes few changes to U.S. trademark law. Sections 521 and 522
of Public Law 103-465, the URAA, contain the trademark provisions, amending the definition of
"abandonment" in section 45 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1127, by increasing from two years
to three years the time of non-use that is prima facie evidence of abandonment, and adds to the
end of Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act a prohibition against registering misleading geographic
indications for wines and spirits.
115. Numerous articles discuss these negotiations and the various proposals which led to
the TRIPS agreement. See, e.g., Michael L. Doane, Note, TRIPS and International Intellectual
Property Protection in an Age of Advancing Technology, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 465
(1994); Al J. Daniel, Intellectual Property in the Uruguay Round: The Dunkel Draft and a
Comparison of U.S. Intellectual Property Rights, Remedies, and Border Measures, 25 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 751 (1993); Eleanor K. Meltzer, TRIPS and Trademarks, Or--GAIT Got Your
Tongue?, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 18 (1993); GILBERT R. WINHAM, THE EVOLUTION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS (1992); Willard A. Stanback, Note, International
Intellectual Property Protection: An Integrated Solution to the Inadequate Protection Problem,
29 VA. J. INT'L L. 517 (1989); Robert W. Kastenmeier and David Beier, International Trade
and Intellectual Property: Promise, Risks, and Reality, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 285
(1989); Carlos A.P. Braga, The Economics of Intellectual Property Rights and the GAIT: A
View from the South, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 243 (1989); Mark L. Damschroder, Note,
Intellectual Property Rights and the GAT: U.S. Goals in the Uruguay Round, 21 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 367 (1988); and Jane Bradley, Intellectual Property Rights, Investment, Trade in
Services in the Uruguay Round: Laying the Foundations, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 57 (1987).
116. Intellectual Property Rights, Trade Information Center and GATT Uruguay Round,
U.S. Dep't Com. (Dec. 10, 1993); see also TRIPS, supra note 108. With few exceptions (and
none related to trademarks), the TRIPS obtained its aims: "establishing adequate minimum
standards for the protection of intellectual property rights; ensuring availability of effective
procedures, internally and at the border, for enforcing those rights; and taking advantage of the
procedures in the GATT for the settlement of disputes regarding the Members' obligations to
establish the minimum standards and the enforcement procedures." Id. Carlisle E. Walters,
Multilateral Trademark issues Affecting the United States, 367 PRAC. LAW INST./PAT. 67
(1993).
117. TRIPS, supra note 108. The Preamble sets forth the TRIPS' purpose "to reduce
distortions and impediments to international trade, and taking into account the need to promote
effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights, and to ensure that measures and
procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate
trade. ... Id.
118. TRIPS, supra note 108.
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discusses the articles relevant to trademarks. Then, it analyzes whether the
GATT 94 signatories recognized the global village and embraced it
through global harmonization of national trademark laws and centralization
of trademark filing and registration.
Articles 15-21 establish the minimum standards for protecting
trademarks in member countries. Other articles provide support for and
enforcement of Articles 15-21.
Article 15 delineates the subject matter capable of constituting a
registered trademark. Such subject matter consists of any signs, including
personal names, letters, numerals, figurative elements and color
combinations or any combination of signs, capable of distinguishing the
goods or services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings." 9
Even if a sign possesses no inherent capability to distinguish the relevant
goods or services, it may still be registered based on distinctiveness
acquired through use.' 0 A member country may condition registration on
a trademark's visual perceptibility.' In addition, registration may be
conditioned on use, but filing may not be conditioned on actual use." An
application must not be refused solely on the basis that the intended use has
not occurred within three years from the date of filing the application.,'
In addition, the nature of the goods and services connected with the
trademark must not be an obstacle to registration.'2 A trademark must be
published before registration or promptly thereafter, and other member
countries must be afforded a reasonable opportunity for cancellation.'
Member countries may also be afforded an opportunity to oppose
registration.'26 Finally, a member country may deny registration on
grounds other than those in Article 15(1), providing such grounds do not
derogate from the Paris Convention.'27
Article 16 confers to a registered trademark owner exclusive right
to prevent all unauthorized third parties from using, in the course of trade,
a sign affixed to identical or similar goods or services as those goods or
services connected with an owner's registered trademark, if such use
119. Id. art. 15(1).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. art. 15(3).
123. TRIPS, supra note 108.
124. Id. art. 15(4).
125. Id. art. 15(5).
126. Id.
127. Id. art. 15(2); Paris Convention, supra note 20.
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would result in a likelihood of confusion.' 8 However, this exclusive right
must not prejudice any existing prior rights, nor affect a member country
from extending rights based on use.'29 In addition, Article 16 expands the
protection offered to well-known marks under Article 6bis of the Paris
Convention.'3 °  When determining if a trademark is well-known,
knowledge of that trademark in the relevant public sector must be
considered; this includes knowledge obtained from the trademark's
promotion which may include any promotion in international trade.' This
also applies to a sign affixed to goods or services, even if the goods or
services are not similar to the goods or services connected to a registered
trademark, if such use would indicate a connection with a registered
trademark that is likely to damage the registered trademark owner's
interest. 32
Article 17 allows a member country to provide limited exceptions
to the trademark rights. However, before permitting any exceptions, the
legitimate interests of the trademark owner and third parties must be
considered. 33
Article 18 requires a .minimum term of seven years for an initial
trademark registration, which shall be renewable indefinitely." " Like the
initial registration term, each renewal term must be at least seven years."'
Article 19 explains that when a member country requires use of
the trademark to maintain registration, the registration may be cancelled
only after non-use for at least three continuous years, unless the trademark
owner can show a valid reason for non-use. 'I The use of a trademark by a
third person, subject to the owner's control, must be recognized as a use
for maintaining the registration.'
Article 20 prohibits special requirements which cause an
unjustifiable encumbrance upon the use of a trademark in the course of
128. TRIPS, supra note 108, art. 16(1). A presumption in favor of likelihood of
confusion exists, if a sign appears to be identical to the registered trademark. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. art. 16(2)(3); Paris Convention, supra note 20, art. 6.
131. TRIPS, supra note 108, art. 16(2).
132. Id. art. 16(3).
133. Id. art. 17 (fair use of descriptive terms constitutes a limited exception).
134. Id. art. 18.
135. Id.
136. TRIPS, supra note 108, art. 19(1). Circumstances beyond the owner's control
creating an obstacle to use, such as import restrictions on or other government requirements for
goods or services protected by a trademark, constitute a valid reason. Id.
137. Id. art. 19(2).
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trade. However, this does not preclude requiring a trademark to identify
the undertaking producing the goods or services along with, but without
linking it to, the trademark distinguishing the specific goods or services in
question of that undertaking. 38
Article 21 allows member countries to determine conditions on
trademark assignment and licensing. At the same time, it prohibits
requiring compulsory licensing and requiring the transfer of the business
when assigning its trademark. 39
In addition, TRIPS provides trademark protection similar to those
sections of the Lanham Act addressing filing and prosecution of trademark
applications by the United States Trademark office." ° The TRIPS also
supports the status quo controlled by territoriality, which allowed President
Clinton to sign GATT 94 without considering the need for global
harmonization of national trademark laws or the viability of a centralized
trademark filing and registration system. Furthermore, TRIPS requires
member countries to comply with Articles 1-12 and 19 of the Paris
Convention 14' which do not harmonize national trademark laws. 42
However, TRIPS does evidence a desire to establish international
standards for trademark rights and obligations by the 117 countries who
signed GATT 94 in Marrakesh, Morocco, on April 15, 1994. These
countries agreed to implement national legislation to meet TRIPS'
minimum standards for trademark rights and obligations. For some
member countries, such implementation involves a measurable change in
policy. Most developing and least-developed member countries possess
inadequate national trademark laws, and some possess no national
trademark laws. This implementation of national trademark laws in the
138. Id. art. 20. Requiring a trademark's use in a special form or in a manner detrimental
to its capability to distinguish goods or services of one undertaking from those of other
undertakings constitute special requirements, which are prohibited, encumbering unjustifiably the
trademark's use. Id.
139. Id. art. 21. See 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1994). See also Walters, supra note 116. The
transfer of a business may be distinguished from the goodwill associated with the trademark.
This distinction is relevant, as some countries, including the United States, do not require a valid
trademark assignment to include the transfer of the business with the trademark but do require a
transfer of "the goodwill of the business connected with the use of and symbolized by the
[trade]mark." Id.
140. TRIPS, supra note 108, arts. 15-21; Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1128 (1994).
See also Meltzer, supra note 115 (summarizing and comparing trademark protection in GATT
and Lanham Act).
141. TRIPS, supra note 108, art. 2(1)(2) (prohibiting any trademark provision in TRIPS
from derogating the existing obligations which member countries may have to each other under
the Paris Convention); Paris Convention, supra note 20, arts. 1-12, 19.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 11-18.
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developing and least-developed member countries constitutes what could
be the beginning of global harmonization and centralization.
In order to accomplish this beginning, TRIPS addresses the
concerns of the developing and least-developed member countries by
providing transitional arrangements that entitle developing and least-
developed countries to delay implementing TRIPS for four years beyond
the one year extended to the developed countries, except for Articles 3
(national treatment), 4 (most favored nation treatment), and 5 (multilateral
agreements on acquisition or maintenance of protection) of Part I which
must be implemented within one year. In addition, the provisions for
patent protection of pharmaceutical and agricultural products are extended
an additional nine years.4 3 The transitional arrangements also require that
the developed countries provide technical and financial cooperation to the
developing and least-developed countries.'" Further, a Council for TRIPS
must be established to monitor the operation of TRIPS and implement
cooperation with the WIPO. 1'4 5  International cooperation, including the
exchange of information, must be instituted to eliminate international trade
in counterfeit goods which infringes trademark rights.' Finally, TRIPS
provides the registered trademark owner with specific civil and criminal
procedures for enforcement of trademark rights within each country and at
each country's borders.'47  However, TRIPS lacks a global centralized
trademark filing and registration system. The author argues such a system
would provide the basis for information exchange, and without such basis,
enforcement would be difficult if not impossible.
L The Trademark Law Treaty, 1994 (TL)
The most recent effort to harmonize national trademark laws and
to create a centralized global trademark and registration system resulted in
the Trademark Law Treaty (TLT). However, the TLT does not provide
any harmonization or centralization, but it does establish common
procedures for national trademark filing and registration, and creates
143. TRIPS, supra note 108, arts. 65-66. See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 115, at 30. This
view demonstrates the United States approved GATr 94 due to what it perceived as protecting its
sovereignty rather than viewing the world as a global village. If the United States recognized and
embraced the global village, it would advocate the need to grant developing and least-developed
member countries additional time to conform their legal systems to TRIPS.
144. TRIPS, supra note 108, art. 67.
145. Id. arts. 68, 71 (requiring Council for TRIPS to review implementation of TRIPS
five years after agreement establishing WTO entered into force).
146. Id. art. 69.
147. Id. arts. 41-61.
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standardized international application forms which all trademark offices
must accept.' 8 The WIPO' 9 initiated the TLT discussions following the
lack of participation in the TRT 50 and the Madrid Protocol.'5 ' Anticipating
an increase in international trademark application filings,'52 the WIPO
convened six sessions of its Committee of Experts on the Harmonization of
Laws for the Protection of Marks (CEHLPM) to discuss a draft trademark
harmonization treaty.
53
At the first session, in 1989, the CEHLPM discussed
harmonization of substantive trademark law.' Harmonization also
dominated the discussion at the second session but proved too
controversial. 155  Since the CEHLPM participants maintained their
protectionist attitudes, refusing to discuss seriously global harmonization of
national trademark laws or even a centralized trademark filing and
registration system, the remaining sessions ignored substantive trademark
law.'56 These sessions focused on a draft trademark treaty prepared by the
WIPO's International Bureau, which addressed only administrative and
procedural matters, including implementing regulations and model
international forms for filing and registration. '51
148. See TLT, supra note 12.
149. See WIPO, supra note 67.
150. See TRT, supra note 76.
151. See Madrid Protocol, supra note 83; see also infra p. 151. Although the United
States did not join the Madrid Protocol, it recognized the importance of an international
trademark filing and registration system, and, thus, it committed to joining such a system if the
system provided safeguard provisions including voting rights. See State Dep't Announcement
That U.S. Will Not Join Madrid Protocol, supra note 94.
152. See Browning, supra note 3, at 352.
153. See Walters, supra note 116.
154. The Committe based its discussion on a 1987 proposal from Dr. Arpad Bogsch, the
Director General of the WIPO. See Diplomatic Conference Adopts TLT, Geneva, WIPO PRESS
RELEASE No. 99 (Geneva), Oct. 28, 1994.
155. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 84 (supporting attempt to first harmonize current
trademark formalities rather than substantive law because difficult to harmonize different national
trademark laws); Samuels & Samuels, supra note 10, at 437-38 (describing participants' lack of
hope in reconciling substantial differences in world trademark law); Walters, supra note 116
(explaining that the United States expressed interest in a trademark harmonization treaty to create
business certainty and uniformity in obtaining international trademark protection but emphasized
that the treaty must recognize United States trademark law, including use-based rights, and allow
United States to enact substantive trademark law); Louis T. Pirkey, Treaty Would Harmonize
Many Trademark Laws, NAT'L LAW J., Oct. 31, 1994, at C17.
156. See id.
157. See Walters, supra note 116.
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On October 10, 1994, the WIPO's Diplomatic Conference for the
Conclusion of the TLT occurred in Geneva. Ninety-seven countries and
intergovernmental organizations, and twenty non-governmental
organizations'58 attended and discussed the CEHLPM draft treaty." 9 On
October 27, 1994, the Conference adopted the TLT.'" The 117 countries
and international organizations signed the "Act of Presence" which
concluded the Conference; thirty-five countries, including the United
States, signed the TLT, which opened for signature on October 28, 1994,
for one year.' 6' The WIPO member countries and certain
intergovernmental organizations may join the TLT even if they are not a
member of the Paris Convention. 62
The TLT contains twenty-five articles'63 and regulations consisting
of eight rules'" and eight model international forms. 65 It applies to "marks
consisting of visible signs, provided that only those Contracting Parties
which accept for registration three-dimensional marks shall be obliged to
apply this Treaty to such marks,"'" and to "marks relating to goods
(trademarks) or services (service marks) or both goods and services."' 6
158. See WIPO, supra note 66, at 2. "The participation of non-governmental
organizations in the preparatory meetings and in the Diplomatic Conference ensured that the
views of the users of the trademark system were taken into account." Id.
159. See id.
160. See State Dep't Announcement That U.S. Will Not Join Madrid Protocol, supra note
94 and accompanying text. Only one obstacle occurred having the potential to kill the TLT: the
European Union (EU) demand of the same voting rights it received in the Madrid Protocol.
(These voting rights resulted in the United States refusing to sign the Madrid Protocol.) See
U.S., 96 Other WIPO Members Conclude International TLT, 49 Pat. Trademark & Copyright
(BNA) No. 1203, at 22 (Nov. 10, 1994). The EU claimed it was entitled to its own separate
vote since trademark applications may be filed both with national patent.offices in the EU
member states and through the recently established European Harmonization Office for the
(European) Internal Market. Id. The United States opposed such a separate EU vote throughout
the negotiations and at the Diplomatic Conference. Unlike the negotiations for the Madrid
Protocol, the WIPO officials reached a compromised solution. The TLT eliminated the
"Assembly" of member countries, avoiding.the need of voting procedures since any voting would
be through the WIPO's General Assembly. Id.
161. See Diplomatic Conference Adopts TLT, supra note 154.
162. See id. at 2; U.S., 96 Other WIPO Member Conclude International TLT, supra note
160, at 23 (explaining that the TRIPS agreement bound all GAlT 94 signatories to Paris
Convention, and most GATT 94 signatories belong to WIPO, so not requiring membership in
Paris Convention lacks any diplomatic significance).
163. See TLT, supra note 12.
151. See id.
165. See id.
166. See id. art. 2(l)(a).
167. See id. art. 2(2)(a).
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However, it does not apply to "hologram marks and to marks not
consisting of visible signs, in particular, sound marks and olfactory
marks,"" nor does it apply to "collective marks, certification marks and
guarantee marks." 69
The TLT establishes maximum procedural requirements which a
member country may impose prior to granting an application filing date, a
trademark registration, or recording an assignment or license.' The
United States Patent and Trademark Office is drafting proposed legislation
to implement the TLT which will cause only procedural changes to United
States trademark law since the TLT contains no substantive trademark law
provisions. 7' The major United States trademark organizations, including
the International Trademark Association,' trademark owners, and bar
associations, support the TLT which has no substantial opposition.'
Although the TLT provides no global harmonization of national
trademark laws or centralization of trademark filing and registration, the
author argues that the TLT constitutes a step towards global harmonization
and centralization. First, an exchange of ideas must occur for the
international trademark community to recognize the global village and to
move toward it. The TLT has encouraged such an exchange of ideas.
Although the participants decided global harmonization of national
trademark law was not feasible at that time, they continued their
discussions until a common procedure and application for trademark filing
and registration was developed and approved. The TLT emerged as the
treaty evidencing these discussions.
"[The TLT] will have a clearly positive economic impact in a
global economic environment in which trademarks become increasingly
important." 74 The numbers of registered trademarks are staggering. The
WIPO has handled over three hundred thousand actual trademark
registrations, and has estimated seven million national trademarks are
registered worldwide, including numerous duplications for registrations in
168. See TLT, supra note 12, art. 2(1)(b).
169. See id. art. 2(2)(b).
170. See id. art. 3(7); Walters, supra note 116.
171. Telephone Interview with Andrew D. Lawrence, Attorney-Advisor, P.T.O., U.S.
Dep't Com. (Jan. 4, 1995) (explaining proposed legislation implementing the TLT will simplify
filing and registration application). See also Samuels & Samuels, supra note 10, at 439-40
(analyzing draft TLT and its effect on United States trademark law); Pirkey, supra note 155
(analyzing draft TLT and its effect on United States trademark law).
172. See Hearings, supra note 84.
173. See Pirkey, supra note 155, at C18.
174. See supra note 155.
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different countries.'73 When considering the number of registrations and
the important differences in relevant national trademark law throughout the
world, the TLT constitutes an important step in unifying the international
trademark community toward global harmonization and centralization.
Furthermore, the TLT shows that compromise can solve differences when
the participants want to proceed toward embracing the global village.
III. IMPLEMENTATION OF TRADEMARK PROTECTION IN THE GLOBAL
VILLAGE
In 1995, multilateral, regional, and bilateral agreements provide
the medium for acquisition and maintenance of trademark rights and
obligations in the global village. Part Three discusses the role of this
medium in implementing trademark protection through global
harmonization of national trademark laws and centralization of trademark
filing and registration.
A. Multilateral Implementation: Council for TRIPS and WIPO
The global village demands multilateral implementation of
trademark rights and obligations. Once the international trademark
community recognizes and embraces the global village, the need for
multilateral implementation becomes self-evident. Both the WIPO76 and
the Council for TRIPS'77 may negotiate global harmonization and
centralization. This section analyzes whether the WIPO or the Council for
TRIPS, or both, should initiate such negotiation.
As previously discussed, the WIPO functions as a specialized
United Nations' agency, administering numerous agreements with
trademark rights and obligations. If the Council for TRIPS did not exist,
the WIPO would provide the primary medium to negotiate global
harmonization and centralization.' However, the Council for TRIPS does
exist; and, it exists, in part, because the WIPO conceded jurisdiction of
intellectual property rights to the Uruguay Round."',
175. U.S., 96 Other WIPO Members Conclude International TLT, supra note 162, at 24.
176. See supra p. 79.
177. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
178. See supra pp. 79-81.
179. See Cordray, supra note 26, at 141. The developing countries argued GATT lacked
jurisdiction over intellectual property rights because Article 18 of the Paris Convention required
any improvement in intellectual property be made through revisions of the Paris Convention.
However, the WIPO lacks a mandate from its members to revise the Paris Convention and,
further, has no funding, so it refuses to revise the Paris Convention, or increase its enforcement.
Id. Thus, the TRIPS agreement became part of GATT 94, and falls within the scope of Article
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Article 68 of TRIPS authorizes the member countries to assign to
the Council for TRIPS the responsibility to negotiate global harmonization
and centralization:
The Council for TRIPS shall monitor the operation of this
Agreement and, in particular, Members' compliance with
their obligations hereunder, and shall afford Members the
opportunity of consulting on matters relating to the trade-
related aspects of intellectual property rights. It shall carry
out such other responsibilities as assigned to it by the
Members, and it shall, in particular, provide any assistance
requested by them in the context of dispute settlement
procedures. In carrying out its functions, the Council for
TRIPS may consult with and seek information from any
source it deems appropriate. In consultation with WIPO,
the Council shall seek to establish, within one year of its
first meeting, appropriate arrangements for cooperation
with [WIPO].'Im
No substantial discussion occurred at the Uruguay Round
regarding global harmonization'8 ' and centralization with respect to
trademarks. However, TRIPS provides that "[iun order to facilitate the
protection of geographical indications for wines, negotiations shall be
undertaken in the Council for TRIPS concerning the establishment of a
multilateral system of notification and registration of geographical
indications for wines eligible for protection in those Members participating
in the system."" ' The author argues this provision can be extended to
include a notification and registration system for trademarks,'83 but without
harmonization of national trademark laws because such a system would
19 of the Paris Convention permitting special agreements consistent with the Paris Convention.
Id. at 142. See generally Hans P. Kunz-Hallstein, The U.S. Proposal for a GAZT Agreement on
Intellectual Property and the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 22
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 265 (1989) (explaining GATT 94 constitutes a special agreement
consistent with Paris Convention).
180. See supra note 18.
181. The TRIPS establishes minimum standards, not harmonization. See TRIPS, supra
note 108.
182. See TRIPS, supra note 108, art. 23(4).
183. Author argues that an extension of Article 23(4) of TRIPS to trademarks does not
conflict with Article 62(1), which allows member countries to require "as a condition of the
acquisition or maintenance of the intellectual property rights provided under Sections 2 through 6
of Part II, compliance with reasonable procedures and formalities. Such procedures and
formalities shall be consistent with the provisions of this Agreement." See TRIPS, supra note
108, art. 62(1).
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lack effectiveness. The author further argues the Council for TRIPS must
take charge and be the dominating force to propel global harmonization
and centralization because unlike the WIPO, TRIPS provides enforcement
for trademark rights and obligations. This enforcement will occur through
the WTO's"' dispute settlement mechanism. 5
In addition, the WTO provides the institutional framework needed
for global harmonization and centralization. As the Ministers declared in
Marrakesh, Morocco, on April 15, 1994, when accepting and acceding to
GATT 94:
mhe establishment of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) ushers in a new era of global economic
cooperation, reflecting the widespread desire to operate in
a fairer and more open multilateral trading system for the
benefit and welfare of their peoples. Ministers express
their determination to resist protectionist pressures of all
kinds. They believe that the trade liberalization and
strengthened rules achieved in the Uruguay Round will
lead to a progressively more open world trading
environment.
Ministers welcome the fact that participation in the
Uruguay Round was considerably wider than in any
previous multilateral trade negotiation and, in particular,
that developing countries played a notably active role in it.
This has marked a historic step towards a more balanced
and integrated global trade partnership. Ministers note
that during the period these negotiations were underway
significant measures of economic reform and autonomous
trade liberalization were implemented in many developing
countries and formerly centrally planned economies."
However, the Council for TRIPS must not ignore the WIPO,
because Article 68 of the TRIPS requires the Council for TRIPS to
establish appropriate arrangements for cooperation with the WIPO, and the
WIPO possesses a tremendous amount of expertise in international
trademark law, both procedurally and substantively. The WIPO's main
184. See WTO, supra note 109.
185. See TRIPS, supra note 108, arts. 64, 68.
186. Marrakesh Ministerial Declaration, April 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1263, 1264.
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activity, which occupies two-thirds of its 450 staff, involves registration of
patents, trademarks, industrial designs, and appellations of origin rather
than negotiation."' In addition, the WIPO offers technical assistance to its
member countries on drafting intellectual property legislation and
managing their offices.'88 Thus, the Council for TRIPS should propose a
working arrangement with the WIPO, which allows it to take advantage of
the WIPO's skill and expertise, especially in light of the TRIPS' lack of
staff " and the controversial issues ' involved in implementing global
harmonization and centralization.
The ideal situation would be for the United Nations to transfer its
jurisdiction over the WIPO to GATT 94, but the author does not advocate
considering such a transfer until the Council for TRIPS proves its worth as
a global protector of trademark rights and obligations. For the present, the
author advocates the Council for TRIPS establishes with the WIPO a
respectful, working relationship in which they recognize and embrace the
global village and initiate the negotiation of global harmonization of
national trademark laws and centralization of trademark filing and
registration.
B. Regional and Bilateral Implementation
Since the end of World War II, the United States relied primarily
on GATT to establish international trade policy. Except in rare cases, the
United States viewed bilateral and regional agreements 9' as, at best,
187. Francis Williams, GATT Joins Battle for Right to Protect, FIN. TIMES, July 7, 1994,
at 7.
188. Id.
189. Id. (explaining TRIPS currently operates with a staff of one and a half persons).
190. Issues encountered in implementing global harmonization of national trademark laws
and centralization of filing and registration are as follows: defining trademark and trademark
protection; protecting prior vested rights; priority of rights; status of regional, national, and local
trademarks; limited amount of words for trademark use; use, bona fide intent to use, or non-use
requirements to file and/or register; concurrent use; secondary meaning; unfair and deceptive
trade practices; abandonment; dilution; opposition; cancellation; confusion; review of refusal to
register; counterfeiting; gray markets; parallel markets; anti-trust violations; territoriality;
licensing and distribution rights; differing views of developed and developing countries;
enforcing rights including multilateral, regional, and unilateral sanctions; effect of technological
advances for computerized searching, filing, and registering. See Harmonization (Uniform
Systems), 82 TRADEMARK REP. 912 (1992) (listing numerous issues but not TRIPS); see also
Centralization (Unified System), 82 TRADEMARK REP. 919 (1992) (isting numerous issues but
not TRIPS); Effect of National and International Trademark Offices Granting and/or Recording
Rights, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 944 (1992) (listing numerous issues but not TRIPS); Trademark
Counterfeiting, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 969 (1992).
191. This article uses the term "bilateral agreement" when two countries are parties to the
agreement; "regional agreement" when more than two countries are parties to the agreement and
1995] Freeman 99
ineffective, and at worst, a serious threat to GATT members' commitment
to the multilateral process." However by the mid-1980's, the government
began to challenge this conventional position as causing, in part; its trade
deficit. "
The passage of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement
helped to support the challenge against the conventional position. 19 In
addition, with the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement'"
and the signing of the Summit of the Americas Declaration of Principles
and the Plan of Action (Summit DOP/POA),9 the conventional position
crumbled. Regional integration" emerged as the United States' new
all parties are within the same hemisphere; and "multilateral agreement" when more than two
countries are parties to the agreement and at least two of the parties are located in different
hemispheres.
192. The United States perceived bilateral and regional agreements as jeopardizing
GATr's most favoured nation principle. Article 4 of the TRIPS defines most-favoured-nation.
With regard to the protection of intellectual property, any advantage, favour, privilege
or immunity granted by a Member to the nationals of any other country shall be
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the nationals of all other Members.
Exempted from this obligation are any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity
accorded by a Member: (a) deriving from international agreements on judicial
assistance and law enforcement of a general nature and not particularly confined to the
protection of intellectual property; (b) granted in accordance with the provisions of the
Berne Convention (1971) or the Rome Convention authorizing that the treatment
accorded by a function not of national treatment but of the treatment accorded in
another country; (c) in respect of the rights of performers, producers of phonograms
and broadcasting organizations not provided under this Agreement; and (d) deriving
from international agreements related to the protection of intellectual property which
entered into force prior to the entry into force of the Agreement Establishing the
WTO, provided that such agreements are notified to the Council for [TRIPS] and do
not constitute an arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination against nationals of other
Members.
193. Senator Max Baucus, A New Trade Strategy: The Case for Bilateral Agreements, 22
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 3-4 (1989). But see generally C. Michael Aho, More Bilateral Trade
Agreement Would Be a Blunder: What the New President Should Do, 22 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 25
(1989).
194. Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987, 27 I.L.M. 281 (entered
into force Jan. 1, 1989) [hereinafter Can-US FTA].
195. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289, 32 I.L.M.
605 [hereinafter NAFTA].
196. The Summit: Declaration, Plan of Action, Statistics, Dec. 11, 1994, BUS. AM., Dec.
1994, at 10-13. [hereinafter Summit DOP/POA]. President Clinton and the leaders of 33 other
Western Hemisphere nations participated in the Summit of the Americas held in Miami, Florida,
in 1994. They signed the Declaration of Principles and the Plan of Action, committing North
America, South America, and the Caribbean Basin to free trade by the year 2005.
197. Christopher P. Lion, Regional Trade Arrangements in the Western Hemisphere, BUS.
AM., Dec. 1994, at 17. Regional integration occurs through a free trade area, customs union, or
common market: customs unions ("the CU") eliminate trade barriers between member countries
while maintaining them with third countries not participating in the agreement, and they maintain
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position.98  These regional agreements support GATT. They pose no
threat to GATT since they constitute GATT-consistent agreements. They
require their provisions to be interpreted consistent with GATT's
provisions.' In addition, most of these agreements include intellectual
property rights and obligations, which, at least, meet TRIPS' minimum
standards, or a higher standard.2"
Such agreements promote a dialogue on international trademark
protection, and further, they encourage countries to address trademark
rights and obligations in international trade. They provide an additional
medium for understanding not only international trademark issues but also
the global village. The author argues a GATT-consistent bilateral or
regional agreement, which provides strong trademark protection,
constitutes a viable medium to encourage the Council for TRIPS to work
toward global harmonization of national trademark laws and centralization
of trademark filing and registration.
common external tariff (CET) nomenclature and rates for third countries; free trade areas ("the
FTA") also eliminate trade barriers between member countries while maintaining them with third
countries not participating in the agreement, but they maintain their own tariffs; and a common
market provides for harmonization of fiscal and monetary policies, but the CU and FTA do not
provide such harmonization.
198. However, the concept of regional integration is not new. Many years ago, Europe
embraced regional integration, and formed the European Union ("the EU"), formally the
European Community. The EU regulates trade within the borders of its member countries; its
regulation includes trademark rights and obligations. In 1988, the EU began trademark
harmonization in earnest with a harmonizing directive. First Council Directive to Approximate
the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trademarks, Dec. 21, 1988, O.J. EUR. COMM. (No.
C 104) [hereinafter "Harmonizing Directive"]. See also James E. Rosini & Christopher C.
Roche, Trademarks in Europe 1992 and Beyond, 19 AM. INTEL. PROP. L. ASS'N Q.J. (1991).
For additional information on bilateral and regional agreements the author refers the reader
to an in-depth article written by C.A. Primo Braga and Alexander J. Yeats, which provides an
analysis of "minilateral and managed" trade throughout the world, listing statistics and the major
bilateral and regional trade agreements. See C.A. Primo Braga & Alexander J. Yeats,
Minilateral and Managed Trade in the Post-Uruguay Round World, 3 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
213 (1994).
199. See, e.g, Summit DOP/POA, supra note 183, at 12.
200. See, e.g, Frank J. Garcia, Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in the North
American Free Trade Agreement: A Successful Case of Regional Trade Regulation, 8 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 817 (1993) (explaining that NAFTA's approach is not only consistent with
GATT but also superior to TRIPS, and complementary to other multilateral intellectual property
regimes); Charles S. Levy & Stuart M. Weiser, The NAFTA: A Watershed for Protection of
Intellectual Property, 27 INT'L L. 671 (1993); Marybeth Peters, The Copyright Office,
(Registration and Recordation), and Recent Developments in Administrative and International
Matters, 384 Prac. L. Inst./Pat., Course Handbook Series No. 94-3916 (Mar. 24, 1994).
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IV. CONCLUSION
In the global village, trademarks constitute valuable business
assets, but they lack the protection valuable business assets customarily
receive. The GATT 94 and, in particular, TRIPS, provide hope that
adequate global protection can be provided for trademarks. However,
such protection will evade the global village until the Council for TRIPS
works in conjunction with the WIPO to harmonize national trademark laws
and creates a centralized filing and registration system.
The international trademark community must take an active role in
their own governments to ensure global trademark protection. GATT-
consistent bilateral and regional agreements, which address trademark
protection, serve as impetuses to the Council for TRIPS to work toward
global trademark harmonization and centralization. In addition, all people
and their governments must abandon yesterday's ideas of protectionism in
favor of today's global village. Then, and only then, will trademarks
receive adequate global protection.
1995]
